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"PAYING FOR THE CHANGE":t FIRST ENGLISH 
EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH OF GLENDALE 
v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES AND THE 
CALCULATION OF INTERIM DAMAGES FOR 
REGULATORY TAKINGS 
Joseph LaRusso' 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court's validation of monetary damages for tempo-
rary regulatory takings in First English Evangelical Lutheran 
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles l supplanted the grad-
ual promulgation of such remedies by state and lower federal courts. 2 
Yet in spite of the Court's authoritative affirmation of the constitu-
tionality of such damages, First English provided little by way of 
guidance to assist in a determination of how the legal requirements 
of the fifth amendment just compensation clause can be reduced to 
practice in order to determine suitable damage awards for regulatory 
takings. In fact, the Court's holding provided no guidance whatso-
ever, except to the extent that it specified that aggrieved property 
t Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922). The title for this Article is 
taken from Justice Holmes's familiar dictum in Mahon that "[wle are in danger of forgetting 
that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving 
the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change." [d. 
o Associate, Palmer & Dodge, Boston, Mass. B.A. Boston University, 1980; M.A. North-
western University, 1981; J.D. Northwestern University, 1989. The author wishes to thank 
Carol Rose, Professor of Law, Yale University, for the invaluable assistance she provided in 
the preparation of this Article during her tenure as Louis Ancell Professor of Law and Public 
Policy at Northwestern University. The author also wishes to thank Len Rtlbinowitz, Profes-
sor of Law, Northwestern University, for his thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of the 
Article, and Merle Jacobs, for her indefatigable support during the time this Article was being 
written. All errors of fact or interpretation are the author's own. 
1482 U.S. 304 (1987). 
2 See Williams, Smith, Siemon, Mandelker & Babcock, The White River Junction Manifesto, 
9 VT. L. REV. 193, 223 (1984). 
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owners must be compensated "for the period during which the taking 
was effective."3 
The exclusive emphasis that the Court placed on the duration of 
temporary takings belies the fact that the calculation of interim 
damages ultimately must depend on a compensation formula com-
prised of three variables: the measure of the property interest or 
"use right" that must be compensated, the amount of property in-
volved, and, finally, the duration of the taking. 4 The most significant 
feature of these variables, with the exception of the amount of 
property involved, is that they are not derived according to any 
method that properly could be called empirical. The determination 
of which use rights are compensable and which are not, and the 
duration of the period during which a taking is "effective,"5 are 
values that do not lend themselves to measurement by metes and 
bounds. Instead, the values assigned to these variables are entirely 
dependent on judicial discretion. The values are not merely quanti-
tative, then, because they will depend ultimately on qualitative judg-
ments encompassing a series of policy decisions that must be incor-
porated into the valuation of the constituent variables that make up 
the three-part damage formula. These policy decisions necessarily 
involve several considerations: a concern for ease of judicial admin-
istration and consistency of result, a concern for satisfying commu-
nity expectations regarding equality of treatment, and a concern for 
the timely resolution of takings claims. 
This Article will proceed on the assumption that monetary dam-
ages have a twofold purpose: to compensate victims and to deter 
future encroachments on private ownership that are unconstitu-
tional. Considerations of fairness and efficiency, therefore, such as 
those mentioned above, will determine not whether, but how, these 
purposes are fulfilled. The discussion will not be restricted to a 
description of the various means by which compensation might be 
3 "We merely hold that where the government's activities have already worked a taking of 
all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to 
provide compensation for the period during which the taking was effective." First English, 
482 U.S. at 321. 
4 These values correspond to the three-dimensional impact Justice Stevens attributed to 
land-use regulation in his dissenting opinion to First English. [d. at 330 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting). According to Justice Stevens, such regulations have "depth," "width," and "length." 
[d. (Stevens, J., dissenting). "As for depth, regulations define the extent to which the owner 
may not use the property in question. With respect to width, regulations define the amount 
of property encompassed by the restrictions. Finally ... regulations set forth the duration of 
the restrictions." [d. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
5 [d. at 321. 
1990] INTERIM DAMAGES 553 
calculated. It will also include an evaluation of the incentives that 
each alternative provides to both property owners and municipali-
ties, because it is on this basis that qualitative distinctions and 
qualitative judgments will be made concerning the calculation of 
interim damages for regulatory takings. 
II. INTERIM DAMAGE CALCULATIONS FOR REGULATORY TAKINGS: 
MEASURES OF REGULATED PROPERTY INTERESTS IN ONE AND 
THREE DIMENSIONS 
The holding of the First English Court, straightforward enough 
as a declaration of the constitutional necessity of awarding monetary 
damages as just compensation for regulatory takings, provided little 
guidance to assist in the calculation of those damages. 6 Specifically, 
insofar as the calculation of damages is concerned, the Court merely 
admonished that, once a regulatory taking is held to have occurred, 
the responsible government must "provide compensation for the 
period during which the taking was effective."7 
The duration of a temporary taking provides a discrete linear 
measure for the calculation of damages, but this temporal component 
alone is insufficient to derive a compensation formula for regulatory 
takings. The inadequacy of employing this single parameter as an 
index of the economic harm caused by temporary takings is sug-
gested by Justice Stevens' conception of the multi-dimensional im-
pact of land-use regulation, provided in his dissenting opinion to 
First English.8 According to Justice Stevens, land-use regulation 
has some fixed "length" to the extent that it is of measurable dura-
tion, "depth" to the extent that it deprives owners of some increment 
6 In Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 276, 598 P.2d 25, 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 378 
(1979), a/I'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), the California Supreme Court held that 
declarative relief or a writ of mandamus were the sole remedies available to a property owner 
who successfully challenged the validity of a zoning ordinance. According to Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, the California Court of Appeal, in its consideration of First English below, "found 
itself obligated to follow Agins 'because the United States Supreme Court hard] not yet ruled 
on the question of whether a state may constitutionally limit the remedy for a taking to 
nonmonetary relief.'" First English, 482 U.S. at 309. The First English holding repaired this 
deficiency in the Court's takings jurisprudence, thus setting aside the basis for the California 
Court of Appeal's reliance upon the nonmonetary relief rule in Agins, and overruling its 
holding against the plaintiff on the applicability of damages. The Supreme Court's validation 
of monetary damages in First English notwithstanding, the California Court of Appeal sub-
sequently held on remand that no monetary damages were due because the plaintiff had not 
sustained a temporary regulatory taking. First English Evangelical, Lutheran Church of 
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 1353, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1989). 
7 First English, 482 U.S. at 321. 
8 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
554 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 17:551 
of the use rights they enjoyed prior to the enforcement of the reg-
ulation, and "width" to the extent that a limited amount of property 
is affected. 9 
In contrast to this volumetric conception of the impact of land-use 
regulation, the holding of the First English Court is notably one-
dimensional in its outlook toward damages. 1o To say that a property 
owner must be compensated, for example, for the three-month pe-
riod during which a taking was effective is to say nothing at all about 
either the amount of property involved or the extent to which the 
invalid regulation infringed the aggrieved owner's use rights. The 
issue, strictly speaking, is not the extent to which a regulation is 
invalid; a regulation is either invalid or it is not. Rather, the issue 
is the proper calculation of an owner's economic injury because the 
severity of this injury will increase as the governmental restrictions 
on ownership increase. 
It has long been recognized that diminutions in property value 
that accrue as the result of governmental regulation are legitimate 
public assessments against private ownership.ll Only those diminu-
tions in value resulting from regulations that are held to be exces-
sively restrictive, and thus invalid, will be compensated. The "gen-
eral rule" that Justice Holmes identified in Pennsylvania Coal Co. 
v. Mahon, 12 and that the First English majority later cited, first set 
forth this threshold limitation on the proper scope of governmental 
regulation: "[t]he general rule at least is, that while property may 
be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be 
recognized as a taking."13 
Justice Holmes's "general rule" set forth the diminution-in-value 
test so often cited as the touchstone for establishing the validity or 
invalidity of governmental land-use regUlation. Almost from the be-
ginning, however, the diminution-in-value test has been applied with 
more authority than certainty. This tendency is evidenced by the 
considerable, if disparate, values so far approved by courts as di-
minutions in value that do not go "too far. "14 
9 First English, 482 U.S. at 330 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
10 [d. at 321. 
11 According to Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922), 
U[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be 
diminished without paying for every such change in the general law. As long recognized, some 
values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power." 
12 260 U.S. 393. 
13 [d. at 415, quoted in First English, 482 U.S. at 314. 
14 See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (75% diminution in 
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The reason for this inconsistency may be a simple lack of consensus 
on the threshold of the diminution-in-value takings limit. Another 
possible explanation could be a threshold limit for regulatory takings 
high enough to include the broad spectrum of lower values that 
courts have thus far approved, including losses up to ninety-five 
percent and higher. 15 The latter explanation is supported by the 
holding in First English, which mandates compensation for regula-
tions that constitute "a taking of all use of property. "16 Moreover, 
the factual circumstances in Mahon suggest that a total deprivation 
of property rights may well have been the limitation that Justice 
Holmes had in mind when he promulgated the "general rule" re-
garding regulatory takings. 17 For the purpose of evaluating compen-
satory damage formulae for regulatory takings, however, it is un-
necessary to establish with any degree of precision, or imprecision, 
the extent to which property rights permissibly may be diminished 
before the takings limit will be exceeded. Rather, it is sufficient 
merely to point out that the vertical measure of property values l8-
the measure of the extent to which regulation deprives property 
owners of the use of their land-has long been the principal feature 
of regulatory takings analysis. Such a vertical measure will be of 
corresponding importance in determining the amount of damages 
required to compensate aggrieved property owners. This insight 
seems fundamental, but it is one the First English majority over-
looked, or neglected to develop. Nowhere in its opinion did the Court 
specify the measure of property rights that should properly be com-
pensated in the event such a taking occurs. 
value not a taking); HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. 
Rptr. 365 (1975) (80% diminution in value not a taking), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976); 
Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla.) (administrative decision allegedly 
reducing plaintiff's building plans by half not a taking), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981). 
15 William C. Haas & Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117 (9th Cir. 
1979) (95% diminution in value not a taking), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1980); Consolidated 
Rock Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638 
(valid restriction on excavation business deprived owner of virtually entire value of property), 
appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962). 
16 First English, 482 U.S. at 321 (emphasis added). 
17 See Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 561, 566-67 (1984) (identification of the company's underground "support estate" as the 
property relevant to the takings claim the basis of Holmes's finding that a 100% diminution 
in value, and thus a taking, had occurred). 
18 The vertical measure of property values discussed here corresponds to Justice Stevens' 
definition of "depth" associated with land-use regulation. See supra note 4 and accompanying 
text. 
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III. ASSESSMENT OF COMPENSABLE PROPERTY INTEREST 
According to the "general rule" first establishe(i DY Justice Holmes 
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,19 regulation that goes "too far" 
will be recognized as a taking.20 Although judicial decisions specify-
ing permissible levels of regulatory restrictions are characterized by 
a wide range of disparate values,21 the mechanism by which a reg-
ulatory taking occurs is rarely questioned: governmental regulation 
severe enough to diminish property values to an extent that is overly 
burdensome, and that does not afford a property owner any recip-
rocal benefit, will be held invalid. 22 
For purposes of compensating landowners for temporary regula-
tory takings, however, it is unclear which increment of diminished 
property values must be compensated. The increment of compens-
able value may be measured in any of several different ways. An 
aggrieved owner could be compensated for (A) the market value that 
his or her property would have if it were entirely free of regulation. 
Alternatively, the owner could be compensated for (B) the value of 
the property interest improperly infringed-the difference between 
the fair market value of the land regulated to the permissible limit 
less its value subject to the invalid restrictions. 23 Finally, the value 
of the owner's proposed but restricted use could be factored into the 
damage formula, and the owner could be compensated for (C) the 
value of the proposed use less the value that the parcel had before 
it was downzoned, or (D) the value of the proposed use less the 
value of the parcel with the invalid restrictions in place. The_ question 
19 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
20 I d. at 415. 
21 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
22 See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415. The mechanism is a function of Justice Holmes's "general 
rule" regarding the diminution of property values, and what he called an "average reciprocity 
of advantage" to property owners subject to regulation. See infra note 103 and accompanying 
text. 
23 This second property interest assessment is suggested by Justice Holmes's "general rule" 
that "if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415. 
Holmes's Mahon opinion is frequently cited for the principle that some level of governmental 
regulation, and the diminution in property values associated with it, is indispensable. See 
supra note 11 and accompanying text. This permissible diminution in property value may 
accrue right up to the takings limit, at which point any further diminution will be held to have 
gone "too far." Thus, the abiding question that is central to all regulatory takings analysis-
that is, "How far is 'too far?"'-would seem to have its logical counterpart in the determination 
of the compensable property interest once a taking is held to have occurred-"How far beyond 
the 'too far' point, the regulatory takings limit, did the invalid regulation diminish the owner's 
property interest?" It is this increment of value that is derived from the second property 
interest assessment. 
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of which restricted property interests to compensate involves con-
sidering the incentives and disincentives associated with each of the 
above alternatives, the ease with which each of the above property 
interest assessments can be administered judicially, and the degree 
to which each assessment satisfies community expectations concern-
ing equal treatment. 
A. Fair Market Value of "Unregulated" Parcel Less Its Value 
With Ordinance in Place 
The first option, the fair market value the parcel would have if it 
were entirely unregulated less its value with the invalid ordinance 
in place, compensates the owner for the most profitable of all possible 
uses-regardless of whether such a use actually would be allowed. 
This level of compensation actually is based on a fiction, because the 
most profitable use, the "highest and best" use, is almost certainly 
one that would not be permitted. 24 
As stated earlier, this discussion assumes that the common pur-
pose of this and the remaining three property interest assessments 
is twofold: to compensate the victim and prevent future misbehavior. 
To the extent that this first damage option takes into account the 
value of prohibited uses, it compensates victims above and beyond 
the value of their actual injuries. This damage option is not merely 
compensatory, then, but also punitive. It is chiefly intended to pro-
vide municipalities with the most compelling disincentive for future 
overregulation. 
The frequency of successful takings claims notwithstanding, the 
imposition of this damage option would have an immediate delete-
rious effect on the disposition of municipal as well as private re-
sources. Because the damage option provides successful plaintiffs 
with a windfall recovery, it encourages property owners to test the 
legal limits of municipal land-use regulation. The inevitable result 
would be an increase in the volume of litigation, and a coincidental 
increase in the total amount of public and private resources devoted 
to the conduct of these disputes. Furthermore, the absence of a clear 
rule of decision concerning the takings limit25 would fail to discourage 
24 Suppose, for example, a brickworks operated in a residential neighborhood. See Hada-
check v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). 
25 The takings limit is that threshold that municipal regulation cannot exceed if it is to avoid 
going "too far" and being "recognized as a taking." Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415; see infra note 
78. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978), Justice 
Brennan characterized takings analysis as an "essentially ad hoc, factual inquir[y 1" dependent 
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potential litigants,26 especially because litigation costs would pale in 
comparison to the value of the potential gain. Under such circum-
stances, litigation costs would be a reasonable investment in view of 
the potentially high rate of return. 
This powerful incentive to litigate has an additional, secondary 
effect. In the absence of a well-defined takings limit, the only means 
by which municipalities could reduce the volume of litigation, and 
hence their total liability, would be to regulate property at a level 
well below the contestable limit. 27 This first damage option, then, 
encourages municipalities to underregulate ownership rights. 
Compensating aggrieved owners for the fair market value their 
land would have if it were entirely unregulated thus introduces dual 
inefficiencies: it results in an overexpenditure of public and private 
resources on litigation and encourages municipalities to regulate 
property ownership at a level that is less than optimal. This damage 
option compensates successful plaintiffs beyond what is constitution-
ally required,28 and it may also result in a deficient level of regulation 
that fails to prohibit uses that are detrimental to the community as 
a whole.29 
upon two separate factors: "[tlhe economic impact of the regulation on the claimant" and the 
"character of the governmental action." [d.; see infra note 88 and accompanying text. 
26 See Priest & Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). 
According to Priest and Klein, potential litigants form rational estimates of the probability of 
their success or failure and base their decision to settle or proceed to trial on that basis. 
Placing the entire range of potential outcomes on a standard bell curve, the authors identify 
a point, Y*, representing the threshold level of fault that will result in a verdict for the 
plaintiff. [d. at 8. For our purposes y* is equivalent to the elusive takings limit. The authors 
then identify another point, Y', which represents the actual level of fault in a specific case. 
[d. at 9. In determining whether or not a particular dispute will result in liability for the 
defendant, the judge or jury need only determine whether Y' is above or below the threshold 
"fault" limit, Y*. The value of Y', accordingly, is of equal significance to the parties, since an 
accurate estimate of the Y' value will indicate whether or not the dispute will result in liability. 
[d. Priest and Klein's analysis suggests that the "ad hoc" determination of liability that 
characterizes regulatory takings cases will increase the parties' frequency of error, since it 
will be very difficult to determine whether or not Y', the diminution in property value 
associated with a particular regulation, is above or below Y*, the takings limit. The indeter-
minate takings limit therefore results in fewer rational decisions concerning whether or not 
to challenge municipal regulations. 
?:l See id. To correlate this conclusion to Priest and Klein's analysis, this municipality's 
decision to regulate property well below the contestable limit corresponds to reducing the 
value of Y' to a degree that would make it unmistakable to even the most litigious property 
owner that the regulation being enforced is well below the takings limit, Y*. 
28 The fifth amendment "makes clear that it is designed not to limit the governmental 
interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of 
otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking." First English Evangelical Lutheran 
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987) (emphasis in original). 
29 1 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.42 (rev. 3d ed. 1979) ("What distinguishes eminent 
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B. Difference Between Fair Market Value of the Property SUbject 
to the Most Stringent Regulation Permitted and Fair Market 
Value Subject to Invalid Restrictions 
The second property interest assessment, the difference between 
the fair market value of the land regulated to the permissible limit 
less its value subject to the invalid restriction, suffers a significant 
disadvantage from the outset-one that would pose an insurmount-
able problem of administration for the courts. This option presumes 
that the takings limit and the permissible level of restrictions on 
property interest may be readily determined. Experience has long 
established, however, that this presumption is not true. 30 The tak-
ings limit consistently has resisted precise calculation, and the de-
termination of which restrictions on ownership are valid and which 
are invalid is dependent entirely on a process that is conceded to be 
an "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiry. "31 
Like the first property interest assessment, which compensated 
the owner for the value that the subject parcel would have if it were 
entirely unregulated, the value of the current assessment is based 
on the value of the alternative absolute, the aggregate depreciated 
value of the maximum permissible restriction on ownership al-
lowed. 32 Furthermore, just as the first damage option compensates 
aggrieved owners for the value of potential uses that probably could 
not be exploited,33 this second assessment, by factoring in the max-
imum diminution in property values allowed, would likely represent 
the depreciated value of a restriction on ownership unequaled by 
any regulation in effect at the time the taking occurred. This as-
sessment is likely to be unrelated to the actual pattern of land-use 
regulation in the community, and it must be asked whether the 
absolute standard represented by the maximum permissible dimin-
ution in value is preferable to a standard based on patterns of allowed 
uses prevalent in the community at the time the taking occurred. 
A "real world" standard based on regulation in effect prior to a 
taking has intrinsic appeal because it depends on regulatory norms 
domain from the police power is that the ... latter involves the regulation of such property 
to prevent its use thereof in a manner that is detrimental to the public interest. "). 
30 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
31 [d.; see supra note 25. 
32 In order for such a "maximized" restriction to be held valid, the diminution in property 
value resulting from its enforcement would have to be poised at the threshold of the takings 
limit. See supra note 23. Whether or not the takings limit may be so precisely reckoned, a 
step which is crucial to the success of this property interest assessment, is another matter. 
See supra note 25. 
33 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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established by the community, as opposed to the standard presently 
under discussion, which represents an assessment of the compens-
able property interest that is theoretical and that resists precise 
definition. Nevertheless, calculating damages according to a "real 
world" standard by deducting the diminished value of a property 
subject to an invalid regulation from its value prior to the taking 
presents a correlative issue of fairness. 
For example,34 suppose Developer A owns a fifty-five acre parcel 
of land which is zoned L-1 (light industrial). After Developer A 
makes a significant initial investment in the construction of light 
industrial facilities, the land is subsequently downzoned and is des-
ignated R-3 (residential). The diminution in value between the orig-
inal L-1 designation and the R-3 designation subsequently enforced 
is estimated to be $141,450. After the downzoning has been success-
fully challenged, and the R-3 zoning regulation invalidated, the court 
awards the plaintiff an amount equal to a market rate of interest on 
the $141,450 property interest assessment for the period during 
which the taking was effective. The stage is now set for the disparate 
result. Developer B owns a fifty-five acre parcel of land, also zoned 
L-1, which adjoins Developer A's parcel. Developer B's parcel is not 
downzoned to R-3, however, as was Developer A's, but instead it is 
zoned MU-4, a designation permitting the construction of multi-unit 
residences containing several apartments under a single roof. The 
diminution in the parcel's value as a result of the imposition of the 
MU-4 zoning regulation is estimated to be $70,000, roughly half of 
that incurred by Developer A and an amount that the court does not 
consider excessive. Developer B's claim challenging the validity of 
the MU -4 designation fails. 
34 The example of Developer A is based on Nemmers v. City of Dubuque, 764 F.2d 502 (8th 
Cir. 1985). The sequence of events illustrated by the example of Developer B is purely 
hypothetical. In Nemmers, the plaintiff developer had invested in the development of a light 
industrial park on his 135-acre tract. Fifty-five acres of the parcel were subsequently annexed 
by the city and zoned for residential use. The plaintiff was Ultimately found to have a vested, 
compensable interest in the parcel's development as a light industrial site. The district court 
awarded the plaintiff expert witness and attorneys' fees but declined to award damages, 
characterizing the damage estimates proposed by the parties as speculative. Citing Justice 
Brennan's dissenting opinion in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 
621, 659 (1981), the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held on appeal that market value 
of the parcel should be determined as of the date of the taking and that the damages paid 
should be sufficient to compensate the owner for the interim period during which he was 
prevented from developing the site as he originally intended. Nemmers, 764 F.2d at 504. On 
this basis the Circuit Court determined that the proper method for assessing damages involved 
calculating a 15% rate of return on the difference between the parcel's original value zoned 
for light industrial development and its diminished value subject to the invalid zoning ordi-
nance, for an interim period of three and one-half years. Id. at 505. 
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This result is inequitable not because of any discrepancy in the 
relative merit of the takings claims presented by developers A and 
B. Rather, the result is inequitable because the above damage cal-
culation shifts the burdens of the restricted property interests dis-
proportionately between the two developers: Developer A receives 
compensation in an amount equal to the loss of the entire diminution 
in value below the original L-1 designation, while Developer B is 
forced to sustain a $70,000 diminution in value for which she will 
receive no compensation. Developer A has been compensated for the 
incremental value of restrictions on ownership that do not exceed 
the takings limit, while Developer B has not been similarly compen-
sated. 
Presuming that the court is correct in its judgment and that the 
diminution in value caused by the MU-4 downzoning is not excessive, 
then the takings limit must lie somewhere between the permissible 
$70,000 diminution in value that Developer B sustained and the 
impermissible $141,450 diminution that Developer A sustained. If a 
court were to determine that the takings limit equalled a $100,000 
diminution in value below the original L-1 zoning regulation, it would 
appear that Developer A should receive only $41,450 in damages, 
an amount equal to that incremental diminution in value in excess 
of the takings limit. The determination to be made is whether ag-
grieved owners like Developer A, the victims of regulatory takings, 
should be compensated for the incremental value of zoning restric-
tions that are enforced against neighboring property owners without 
the need for compensation. 
One reason for compensating victims of regulatory takings may 
be to provide aggrieved owners with some measure of damages that 
in effect surpasses the amount required to compensate them. Dam-
ages in excess of the value of those use rights that impermissibly 
were infringed are imposed in order to provide municipalities with 
a more compelling disincentive to indulge in overregulation. Such a 
scheme, however, seems to provide municipalities with an incentive 
to maximize restrictions on ownership. Maximized restrictions, if 
pushed to the threshold of the takings limit, would guarantee that 
aggrieved owners would receive compensation only for those dimin-
utions in value in excess of the takings limit. 
The municipality in the example above would be imprudent to 
zone property L-1 and thus, risk having to pay the $70,000 difference 
in value between the L-1 and MU -4 zoning regulations in the event 
ofa taking. Instead, it could eliminate the risk of that added potential 
loss, and more, by diminishing property values to the fullest extent 
allowed by the regulatory takings limit. However much this com-
562 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 17:551 
pensation scheme might encourage municipalities to maximize re-
strictions on ownership, such a strategy is a practical impossibility. 
In order for the strategy to be successful, municipalities necessarily 
would have to gamble that their estimations of the regulatory taking 
limit uniformly are correct. This is a high-risk endeavor in view 
of the fact that regulatory takings analysis must be undertaken 
on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis. 35 A mistake in the determination 
of the takings limit would mean that a municipality gambling on 
minimizing a potential liability would have incurred a very real 
one instead. 
These observations anticipate the discussion of the fourth property 
interest assessment,36 but they effectively illustrate the fundamental 
dilemma of formulating a property interest assessment that yields 
results that are equitable and that also may be readily and effectively 
administered by the courts. The second property interest assess-
ment-the difference between the fair market value of the land 
regulated to the permissible limit less its value subject to the invalid 
restrictions-seems a fair means of compensating owners because it 
shifts the burdens of restricted property interests equally among all 
property owners by compensating only those property interests that 
are improperly infringed. It does not compensate aggrieved owners 
for the incremental value of those restrictions on ownership that do 
not exceed the taking limit. 
Still, whatever advantage the second assessment may have in 
terms of fairness it lacks in terms of efficiency. Because it requires 
courts to determine the precise value of the regulatory takings limit, 
the administration of the assessment is certain to prove unduly 
burdensome. 37 A property interest assessment that relies instead 
on the value of an owner's proposed use, such as assessments (C)38 
and (D),39 would allow courts to circumvent this administrative 
stumbling block by incorporating values introduced by the parties 
themselves. It remains to be determined, however, whether the 
relative fairness of property interest assessments derived in 
this way equals the advantage they provide in terms of ease of 
administration. 
35 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see supra note 
25. 
36 See infra notes 57-61 and accompanying text. 
37 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124; see also infra note 78. 
38 See infra notes 40-56 and accompanying text. 
39 See infra notes 57-61 and accompanying text. 
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C. Fair Market Value of Proposed Use Less Fair Market Value 
Subject to Prior Regulation 
The inherent appeal of the final two property interest assessments 
is that they take into account the actual value of the owner's pro-
posed use. Whereas the first two formulations depend for their 
calculation on values representing opposite extremes of minimum 
and maximum restrictions on ownership,40 the emphasis on the own-
er's proposed use shifts the focus of the inquiry away from the value 
of uses that may properly be restricted to the value of uses that 
must be allowed-or compensated if they are not. 
The third damage option compensates for the difference between 
the value of the owner's proposed use and the value the property 
would have subject to the level of regulation that was in effect prior 
to the downzoning. 41 The difference in values between the owner's 
proposed use and the parcel subject to the regulation formerly in 
effect, however, may in fact be no difference at all. If the owner 
developed plans for the proposed use in reliance upon the former 
regulation, then the value of the proposed use may be exactly equiv-
alent to the temporary use value of the land subject to the previous 
zoning restrictions. For example, if an owner proposed constructing 
a multi-unit residence on property zoned for that purpose, and the 
municipality subsequently improperly designated the property as 
open space, the aggrieved owner would receive compensation for 
the temporary use value of the property zoned, as it had been, for 
multi-family housing. The third property interest assessment would 
therefore be equal to the temporary use value of the property subject 
to the previous level of regulation "for the period during which the 
taking was effective."42 
There are two reasons for calculating the property interest as-
sessment in this way. First, the value of the owner's proposed use 
and the value of the property subject to the regulation in effect prior 
to the downzoning may not, in every case, be equal. 43 Secondly, in 
40 See supra notes 24--39 and accompanying text. 
41 See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. 
42 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304, 321 (1987). 
43 The assessment would yield an incremental difference in values in cases in which plans 
for a proposed use were developed in reliance upon a promised "upzoning" that is later denied. 
In such a case the value of the proposed use would exceed the value of the land subject to 
the regulation in effect before the repudiation of the promised rezoning. Presuming that the 
promised upzoning had been improperly denied, the aggrieved owner would thus receive 
damages equal to the temporary use value of the property zoned at the promised level. 
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cases in which these values are equal, compensating aggrieved own-
ers merely for the temporary use value of their property appears to 
be in accord with the compensatory formula favored by the First 
English majority. 
Though the First English holding provides little guidance as to 
how compensation should be calculated,44 the majority opinion en-
dorses the value of leasehold interests as an appropriate measure of 
the amount of compensation owed victims of temporary takings. 
Specifically, the First English majority cited with approval the 
Court's opinion in United States v. Dow that "[iJn such cases com-
pensation would be measured by the principles normally governing 
the taking of a right to use property temporarily. "45 As examples of 
cases in which the "principles normally governing" the compensation 
of temporary takings were at work, the Dow Court cited three World 
War II-era cases, Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States,46 United 
States v. Petty Motor CO.,47 and United States v. General Motors.48 
In all three cases, the Court approved the measure of leasehold 
interests as the basis for compensating owners whose property had 
been temporarily taken in support of the nation's war effort. 49 
This discussion has assumed that monetary damages have a two-
fold purpose: to compensate victims and to deter future misbehavior. 
It is apparent that the third property interest assessment would 
compensate victims for that period of time during which the invalid 
regulations prevented them from enjoying their property in the 
manner they had proposed, but it is unclear whether the assessment 
sufficiently deters future municipal misbehavior. Specifically, this 
method of calculating the property interest assessment is pegged 
not to the diminished value of the property subject to the invalid 
regulation, but to the leasehold value of the property when the prior, 
valid regulation was in effect. This property interest assessment 
therefore has nothing to do with the effect of the challenged regu-
44 See First English, 482 U.S. at 321. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
45 First English, 482 U.S. at 318 (quoting United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17,26 (1958». 
46 338 U. S. 1 (1949). 
47 327 U.S. 372 (1946). 
48 323 U. S. 373 (1945). 
49 In Kimball Laundry the Court held that "the proper measure of compensation is the 
rental that probably could have been obtained, and so this Court has held in [General Motors 
and Petty Motor]." 338 U.S. at 7. In Petty Motor the Court determined that the proper amount 
of compensation equalled "the value of the use and occupancy of the leasehold for the remainder 
of the tenant's term, plus the value of the right to renew [the lease]." 327 U.S. at 381. In 
General Motors the Court determined that just compensation equalled the market rental value 
of the property taken. 323 U.S. at 381. 
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lation, and although it compensates the property owner for the 
temporary use value of the property for the period during which the 
taking was effective,50 the magnitude of the damage award is not 
contingent upon the degree of municipal overregulation. If it were 
contingent, the deterrent effect of the property interest assessment 
would be dynamic, increasing as the restriction imposed by the 
invalid regulation increased in severity. This suggestion anticipates, 
however, the discussion of the fourth property interest assessment 
to follow. 51 
The only justification that can be offered for not providing munic-
ipalities with a more potent disincentive is that the unsettled state 
of the takings question is apt to operate as a trap for the wary and 
the unwary alike. If the Supreme Court has acknowledged that it 
cannot with any degree of certainty resolve the question of what 
constitutes a taking, 52 it is unrealistic to expect municipalities to be 
any more certain. The Supreme Court's imposition of monetary dam-
ages for temporary regulatory takings seems to suggest that munic-
ipalities are indeed able, with some degree of confidence, to discrim-
inate between restrictions on ownership that are valid and those 
that are not. 
The argument that municipalities are best placed to determine the 
propriety as well as the legality of zoning restrictions is one that has 
been made consistently from the time of the State Zoning Enabling 
Act (SZEA) to the present. 53 Local governmental control presumes 
a ready access to information and expertise regarding community 
land use that would be impossible for any larger governmental unit 
to achieve. Local control also allows active community participation 
in decisions that are primarily of local concern,54 thus providing 
residents with a mechanism for consensus-building, and some mea-
sure of control over subjective values such as "quality of life." All of 
50 First English, 482 U.S. at 321. 
51 See infra notes 55-61 and accompanying text. 
52 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). See infra note 78. 
5., The SZEA emphasized the supremacy of local governments in formulating and adminis-
tering land-use regulation: 
Sec. 1. Grant of Power. For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals or 
the general welfare of the community, the legislative body of cities and incorporated 
villages is hereby empowered to regulate .... 
Standard State Zoning Enabling Act U.S. Dep't of Commerce rev. ed. (1926), reprinted in 
Model Land Dev. Code (Tent. Draft No. 11968) app. A at 210-21. 
54 But see Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 
336 A.2d 713 (illustrating the broad social implications of local land-use decisions and their, at 
times biased, role in the formation of regional obligations), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 
423 U.S. 808 (1975). 
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these factors can be presumed to give local municipalities an advan-
tage over the courts when it comes to determining the validity of 
regulations. The issue, however, may not be whether local munici-
palities are better equipped than the courts, but whether they are 
equally as well equipped to recognize when a proposed ordinance 
will fail to distribute the burdens of regulation fairly. 55 The imposi-
tion of monetary damages for regulatory takings encourages local 
governments to fully evaluate the effects of their regulation ex ante, 
by forcing municipalities to internalize the costs associated with 
invalid regulations. If municipalities are thus compelled to be less 
cavalier about the effects of regulation,56 even if they cannot be 
completely confident concerning the validity of whatever regulation 
is finally enacted, injuries to property owners are at least that much 
more likely to be avoided altogether. The one sure advantage that 
municipalities possess over the courts is that they are in a position 
to prevent economic harms before they occur. 
D. Fair Market Value of the Proposed Use Less Fair Market 
Value of Land Subject to the Invalid Regulation 
The fourth property interest assessment, which provides compen-
sation for the difference between the value of an owner's proposed 
use and the value of the property subject to the invalid regulation, 
would appear to strike a balance between owners and municipalities. 
The difference between the value of the proposed use and the value 
of the downzoned property clearly defines the increment of monetary 
loss that the aggrieved owner sustained. To the extent that the 
fourth property interest assessment defines the extent to which an 
aggrieved owner's property interest has been infringed, it shares at 
least one important characteristic with the wartime physical invasion 
cases cited by the First English Court:57 certainty. The current 
property interest assessment, however, may be more aptly illus-
trated by physical invasions that are partial, such as the partial 
flooding of land as the result of some governmental action. 58 Such an 
analogy presumes that the extent of the encroachment onto the 
55 In Justice Brennan's words, the economic injuries "remain disproportionately concen-
trated on a few persons." Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. lO4, 124 (1978). 
56 See infra note 85 and accompanying text. 
57 Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949); United States v. Petty Motor 
Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946); United States v. General Motors, 323 U.S. 373 (1945). 
58 See, e.g., United States v. 531.lO Acres in Anderson County, S.C., 243 F. Supp. 981 
(D.S.C. 1965). 
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owner's land-or use rights, as is the case in the regulatory con-
text-can be measured precisely. Just as the physical encroachment 
can be measured to within fractions of an acre, the extent of the 
owner's monetary loss can be precisely measured according to the 
difference between the fair market value of the proposed use and 
the value of the parcel subject to the invalid regulation. 
Like the first and second property interest assessments above, 
the fourth property interest assessment deducts the value of the 
parcel subject to the invalid regulation. Unlike the first two property 
interest assessments, however, this figure is deducted from a value 
that, in effect, defines the outer "boundary" of the owner's com-
pensable property right-the value of the proposed use that the 
owner thought legal under the existing regulation. 59 It remains to 
be seen, then, how the fourth property interest assessment differs 
from the "real world" standard introduced earlier as an alternative 
to the second property assessment. The "real world" standard de-
ducted the value of the property subject to the invalid regulation 
from its value prior to the taking. The fourth property interest 
assessment deducts the value of the property subject to the invalid 
regulation from the value of the owner's proposed use. In the ma-
jority of cases, however, owners propose uses in reliance upon ex-
isting regulations. In such cases there is no difference between the 
two property interests,60 at least no monetary difference. 
If there is any difference at all between the two assessments, then 
it is a difference in emphasis. The fourth property interest assess-
ment places the emphasis on individual property owners by acknowl-
edging implicitly that each is differently situated. For example, the 
parcels owned by two adjoining property owners, Developer A and 
Developer B, are subject to the same L-1 (light industrial) regula-
tion. Developer A has invested in the development of a light indus-
trial park, having so far incurred such expenses as architects' fees 
and site preparation costs. Developer B has not invested in the 
development of a light industrial park or any other use, and her 
parcel remains "raw" land. Subsequently, both parcels are down-
zoned and given an R-3 (residential) designation. Because Developer 
A has established an "investment-backed expectation," the down-
59 "'It is the owner's loss, not the taker's gain, which is the measure of the value of the 
property taken.'" First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304, 320 (1987) (quoting United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946)). 
60 In cases in which owners propose uses in reliance upon a promised upzoning the result 
would be different. See supra note 43. 
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zoning may be held to be a taking with respect to his parcel, while 
the downzoning may be held a valid exercise of municipal regulatory 
authority with respect to Developer B's parcel. 61 
This distinction in emphasis between the two property assess-
ments may seem subtle. The fourth property assessment, however, 
recognizes that takings may not necessarily depend exclusively on 
some quantum diminution in value, but may also depend on those 
uses that are being planned, or are being constructed, or are cur-
rently being operated in reliance upon existing regulation. The 
fourth property interest assessment thus provides municipalities 
with practical criteria by which to undertake an ex ante analysis of 
proposed restrictive regulation by encouraging the review of existing 
permits and licenses. By contrast, a property interest assessment 
that takes into account the value of property prior to a proposed 
downzoning encourages a gross analysis that does not distinguish 
among a broad range of allowed uses. Nevertheless, in the event 
that a municipality enacts a regulation that is so onerous that it 
deprives even owners of undeveloped land of any use of their prop-
erty, the presumption must be that the use that they would have 
developed would have been the most lucrative allowed by the su-
perceded regulation. In fact, taking into account the value of prop-
erty prior to a taking presumes that an owner would have maximized 
its value by proposing the most intensive use then allowed. In this 
sense, the "real world" assessment is a subcategory of the fourth 
property assessment, since employing the value of property subject 
to superceded regulation is really a presumption concerning the 
value of an owner's proposed use. 
In terms of calculating damages in the event a taking is held to 
have occurred, the fourth property interest assessment simulta-
neously comprehends the extent of the injury to the owner, since it 
is based on the value of a proposed use, and the magnitude of the 
governmental infraction-the greater the restriction on property 
rights, the more severe the damages award. For this reason, the 
fourth property assessment encourages municipalities to examine 
most closely those regulations that are the most severe, since the 
difference between the value of the proposed use and the invalid 
regulation will increase as the severity of the regulation is increased. 
61 See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 191 
(1985); see infra note 72. But see Nemmers v. City of Dubuque, 764 F.2d 502, 503 (8th Cir. 
1985) (owner held to have a vested right in the zoned status of his land after investing 
"heavily" in its development). 
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The fourth property assessment thus satisfies the dual purpose of 
compensating victims for the harms that they have sustained and 
deterring future misbehavior. Furthermore, because the fourth 
property assessment depends on values that have been provided by 
the parties themselves, it satisfies another primary goal of compen-
satory damage formulae-ease of administration by the courts. For 
example, unlike the second property interest assessment,62 the 
fourth assessment makes it unnecessary for courts to scrutinize such 
imponderables as the precise value of the regulatory takings limit, 
and relieves courts of the responsibility of determining the extent, 
and thus the value, of the property interest improperly infringed. 
IV. THE DURATION OF THE TAKING 
The First English holding specified that compensation for tem-
porary regulatory takings must be paid "for the period during which 
the taking was effective. "63 This definition of the duration of the 
taking period coincides with that first advocated by Justice Brennan 
six years before in his dissenting opinion to San Diego Gas & Electric 
Co. v. City of San Diego. 64 At least with respect to his advocacy of 
monetary damages for temporary regulatory takings, Justice Bren-
nan's opinion in San Diego was in fact a "majority" dissent. Although 
the Court determined in a five-to-four vote that it could not reach 
the taking and compensation claims that the case presented because 
of the absence of a final judgment below,65 Justice Rehnquist's con-
curring opinion supported Justice Brennan's view that the Consti-
tution required compensation for regulatory takings.66 San Diego 
was the first indication that a consensus in favor of compensating 
regulatory takings had coalesced among the members of the Court. 67 
62 See supra notes 30--39. 
63 First English, 482 U.S. at 321. 
64 450 U.S. 621, 658 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
The constitutional rule I propose requires that, once a court finds that a police power 
regulation has effected the "taking," the government entity must pay just compen-
sation for the period commencing on the date the regulation first effected the "taking," 
and ending on the date the government entity chooses to rescind or otherwise amend 
the regulation. 
Id.; see also First English, 482 U.S. at 321; San Diego, 450 U.S. at 653. 
65 San Diego, 450 U.S. at 630. 
66 Id. at 633--34. "If I were satisfied that this appeal was from a 'final judgment or decree' 
of the California Court of Appeal, ... I would have little difficulty in agreeing with much of 
what is said in the dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan." Id. 
67 See id. at 633--34, 653. Specifically, the plaintiff in San Diego attacked the rule promulgated 
in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), aff'd on 
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The First English holding confirmed that a majority of the Court 
still approved of Justice Brennan's position regarding damages for 
temporary takings, including his definition of the compensable in-
terim period as the interval during which the taking was effective. 
Neither First English nor Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in 
San Diego, however, identified an event that would initiate the 
period during which a taking is effective, in effect leaving open the 
entire question of when, precisely, a taking becomes "effective." If 
Justice Brennan and the First English majority intended that the 
interim takings period should be initiated by a municipality's adop-
tion of an invalid regulation, or should begin on the date a regulation 
is originally enforced, both of these definitions of the compensation 
period have not been without their detractors. These critics suggest, 
for example, that equity would be better served if the compensation 
period were initiated upon the filing of a complaint, so as to discour-
age plaintiffs from "sandbagging" municipalities by filing just before 
the termination of the statutory limitations period in order to max-
imize their claims. 68 Similarly, the filing of an application for admin-
istrative relief has also been proposed as the proper event by which 
to initiate the compensation period. 69 Other possible inaugural 
"events" include notification that an application for administrative 
relief has been denied, or a judicial determination that a regulatory 
taking has occurred. 70 
Each of these takings "events" represents a different value for 
the duration of the compensation period. In the order of their in-
creasing magnitude, the initiating events of a proposed takings pe-
riod could be listed as follows: the judicial determination that a taking 
has occurred; the filing by the plaintiff of a complaint; the denial of 
the plaintiff's application for administrative review; the date on 
which the regulation had first been adopted or enforced. 71 
other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), that the exclusive remedy for regulatory takings was 
invalidation of the regulation by writ of mandamus or declaratory relief. San Diego, 450 U.S. 
at 630. The Court had two other opportunities after Agins and San Diego to consider consti-
tutional just compensation claims for regulatory takings before finally approving monetary 
damages in First English, but the Court held in both cases that the takings claim that each 
presented was not yet "ripe" for review. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 
477 U.S. 340, 351-52 (1986); Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 
473 U.S. 172, 200 (1985). 
68 Williams, supra note 2, at 223. 
69 Freilich, Solving the "Taking" Equation: Making the Whole Equal the Sum of Its Parts, 
15 URB. LAW. 447, 472-73 (1983). 
70 Williams, supra note 2, at 223. 
71 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304, 321 (1987). It is unclear whether the compensation period specified in the First 
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It should be noted that this chronology is by no means the only 
one possible. In cases in which the municipality does not afford an 
opportunity for administrative review, or in cases in which the plain-
tiff complains that it would be futile to file a petition for administra-
tive review, a complaint will be the first formal indication that a 
regulation has imposed an invalid restriction on the plaintiff's prop-
erty. It is logical to assume, however, that because the First English 
Court failed to mention any of the preceding alternative inaugural 
events, it did not intend prior applications for administrative review 
or previous adjudications of a takings claim to have an effect on the 
period for which compensation is required. Compensation would be 
required for the period beginning on the date the taking became 
"effective," presumably either the date of enactment or original 
enforcement, and ending on the date that the municipality either 
condemned the property or rescinded the measure. 
In the four regulatory takings cases that the Court considered in 
the years preceding First English, concerns regarding the ripeness 
and exhaustion doctrines prevented the Court from reaching the 
issue of whether damages were constitutionally required to compen-
sate regulatory takings. 72 But the Court's concern in the earlier cases 
English holding would begin on the date the regulation became effective (that is, enforceable), 
if such a date were specified in the ordinance, or if the taking would become effective on the 
date the ordinance was enacted. If Justice Brennan's formulation is any indication, one of 
these two "events" would seem to initiate the takings period. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. 
City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 658 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Critics of Justice 
Brennan's definition of the compensation period have argued that the "effective" period of the 
taking would begin with the adoption of the invalid regulation. See Williams, supra note 2, at 
223; Freilich, supra note 69, at 473; Morgan, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies as a 
Municipal Defense to Inverse Condemnation Actions, 1985 INST. ON PLAN. ZONING & EMI-
NENT DOMAIN 9-1,9-33 n.6 (1985). If the First English holding requires that the compensation 
period begin either on the date an invalid regulation is adopted, or a subsequent date when 
it is first enforced, the "effective" taking period thus specified would be maximized relative 
to interim periods initiated by other proposed taking events. 
72 First English, 482 U.S. at 321. The ripeness doctrine requires that the property owner 
determine whether or not the regulation has been applied finally to his or her property. The 
exhaustion doctrine requires that the property owner use specified administrative procedures 
for review to discover whether or not the effect of the regulation can be mitigated. See 
Morgan, supra note 71, at 9-2. The purpose of both doctrines is to determine the final 
disposition of the governmental regulation as it affects the subject property. 
[Tlhis Court consistently has indicated that among the factors of particular signifi-
cance in the inquiry are the economic impact of the challenged action and the extent 
to which it interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations. Those factors 
simply cannot be evaluated until the administrative agency has arrived at a final, 
definitive position regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue to the particular 
land in question. 
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 191 (1985) 
(citation omitted). 
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with whether or not the plaintiffs had submitted a plan for the 
development of their property;73 or whether further proceedings 
were necessary in the court below to determine if a taking had indeed 
been effected;74 or whether the plaintiff had sought variances to 
develop the subject property according to a proposed plan;75 or 
whether the appropriate governmental unit had given its "final de-
finitive position" concerning how the regulation will affect the plain-
tiff's property76 had to do with whether the Court properly had 
jurisdiction to review the lower court decisions. In none of the earlier 
cases did the Court consider the effect that a petition for adminis-
trative review or the filing of a complaint would have on the duration 
of the compensation period for regulatory takings. On this point the 
First English holding is the most authoritative expression of the 
Court's judgment concerning the proper measure of the takings 
period, though in the absence of a Court-specified takings event, the 
precise duration of the effective takings period remains less than 
certain. Still, if a court determines that a property owner has sus-
tained a regulatory taking, after first determining that the claim is 
ripe for review and that all administrative means to mitigate the 
effect of the regulation have been exhausted, the compensation pe-
riod must be measured according to the direction of First English-
a direction that arguably may require compensation for the period 
retroactive to the date that the regulation was originally enacted or 
enforced. Measuring the compensation period according to this di-
rection maximizes the duration of the period during which a taking 
is "effective," and maximizes municipal liability to a corresponding 
degree. The First English holding thus appears to provide the most 
powerful disincentive to municipal overregulation of property own-
ership. 
Given the unpredictable, "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiry" that 
regulatory takings analysis is conceded to be,77 municipalities nec-
essarily find themselves in a precarious position each time they 
attempt to evaluate the validity of their land-use regulation, some-
thing they must be able to do with some measure of confidence if 
they are to avoid potentially large liabilities. Yet, if the Supreme 
Court has itself withdrawn and resigned the field where the takings 
7:3 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). 
74 San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 633 (1981). 
75 Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 187. 
76 MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 349 (1986) (quoting 
Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 191). 
77 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
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limit is concerned,78 it is doubtful that municipalities will be any 
more successful in determining which regulations are excessive and 
which are not. As helpless as the Supreme Court when it comes to 
fixing the takings limit with any degree of certainty, municipalities 
will tend toward overprecaution when drafting regulations in order 
to avoid liability. In effect, monetary damages for regulatory takings 
compel municipalities to ·assume the burden of an uncertain limit 
upon takings. The inherent hazard of such an arrangement is that it 
will result in some level of underregulation. By the same token, prior 
to First English, the burden of the uncertain limit upon takings had 
been internalized by property owners who were subject to invalid 
land-use regulations without benefit of compensation. The inherent 
hazard of this arrangement was that it provided governments with 
an incentive to overregulate. 79 
Insofar as the durational component of the tripartite taking for-
mula is concerned,80 the ripeness and exhaustion doctrines point the 
way toward a more efficient and equitable result. The very purpose 
of these doctrines, to engage landowners in the local decisionmaking 
process,81 depends upon established means by which municipalities 
and individuals may define their opposing interests and attempt to 
reach an accommodation. If municipalities have been left to discover 
for themselves the boundary line of the takings limit, as it appears 
they have, the participation of aggrieved property owners in admin-
istrative procedures is crucial. 
While property owners and developers have always been accorded 
a role in local land-use decisions, these administrative processes tend 
78 [d. at 123-24. 
The question of what constitutes a 'taking' for purposes of the Fifth Amendment has 
proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty ..... [Tlhis Court, quite simply, 
has been unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice and 
fairness' require that economic injuries caused by a public action be compensated by 
the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few per-
sons. 
[d.; see also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174-75 (1979). 
79 Lawrence Blume and Daniel Rubinfeld refer to governmental failure to pay compensation 
as "fiscal illusion." According to the authors, "[fJiscal illusion arises because the costs of 
governmental actions are generally discounted by the decision-making body unless they ex-
plicitly appear as a budgetary expense. Compensation removes fiscal illusion because it re-
quires a budgetary outlay. It can thus serve as a corrective device for governmental failure." 
Blume & Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 10 RES. IN LAW 
AND ECON. 53, 84 (1987) (citations omitted). 
80 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304, 330 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
81 Morgan, supra note 71, at 9-5. 
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to center around dealmaking activities. 82 In accordance with section 
3 of the SZEA, municipalities develop plans for future community 
development. 83 In practice, however, restrictive "plan" zoning 
merely served as the basis for municipal negotiations with landown-
ers and developers whose projects invariably involved more inten-
sive uses than those permitted by the initial regulation. 84 If negoti-
ations were unsuccessful, or if antidevelopment, political forces 
prevailed, or if municipalities sought to downzone property to an 
even more restrictive level, there was little incentive prior to First 
English for municipalities to further involve affected property own-
ers. When injunctive relief was the only remedy for which property 
owners could hope, municipalities would leave to the courts the 
determination of the validity or invalidity of imposed regulations. If 
a court held a regulation invalid, then the municipality could merely 
redraft the ordinance according to the court's findings and either 
exhaust the property owner's resources or proceed with another 
round of litigation. 85 
"2 See R. ELLICKSON & D. TARLOCK, LAND USE CONTROLS 236--38 (1981). 
!l3 Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, § 3, U.S. Dep't of Commerce rev. ed. (1926), 
reprinted in Model Land Dev. Code (Tent. Draft No.1, 1968) app. A at 210, 214-15. 
Id. 
Sec. 3. Purposes in View. Such regulations shall be made il!~cordance with a 
comprehensive plan and designed to lessen congestion in the stre~r§;to secure safety 
from fire, panic, and other dangers; to promote health and the general welfare; to 
provide adequate light and air; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid undue 
concentration of population; and to facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, 
water, sewerage, schools, parks, and other public requirements .... 
&1 See Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local 
Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 837, 849-50 (1983) (anticipated stabilizing influence of land-
use plans as independent controls on municipal regulation vitiated by piecemeal zoning changes 
bargained for by individual developers); see also R. ELLICKSON & D. TARLOCK, supra note 
82, at 58-59 (characterizing zoning maps as "first offers" and negotiated land-use controls as 
"final offers"). 
"5 Justice Brennan took note of this now foreclosed strategy in his dissenting opinion to San 
Diego and quoted the following excerpt from an address given at the 1974 annual conference 
of the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers: 
If legal preventive maintenance does not work, and you still receive a claim attacking 
the land use regulation, or if you try the case and lose, don't worry about it. All is 
not lost. One of the extra "goodies" contained in the recent [California] Supreme 
Court case of Selby v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, appears to allow 
the City to change the regulation in question, even after trial and judgment, make 
it more reasonable, more restrictive, or whatever, and everybody starts all over 
again. 
See how easy it is to be a City Attorney. Sometimes you can lose the battle and 
still win the war. Good luck. 
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The post-First English regime, by comparison, requires munici-
palities to consider the effects of regulation ex ante, not ex post after 
a court has established that the scheme is excessive and invalid. 
There is a limit, however, on the extent to which municipalities will 
be able to anticipate the effects of proposed regulations before the 
fact. This limitation in inherent in takings analysis undertaken ex 
ante. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,86 the 
Supreme Court stated that the evaluation of a challenged regulation 
"depends largely 'upon the particular circumstances [in that] case,'''87 
including: "[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant 
... particularly, the extent to which regulation has interfered with 
distinct investment-backed expectations . . . [and] the character of 
the governmental action. "88 The impediment to any ex ante analysis 
of the impact of a regulation is the determination of the extent to 
which it interferes with "investment-backed expectations. "89 If mu-
nicipal governments are to be successful in determining which reg-
ulations are excessive and thus illegal, they must necessarily have a 
means of gauging the frustration of owner expectations. 90 
Proof of a diminution in value as the result of a downzoning will, 
in itself, be insufficient to establish a taking, unless that diminution 
can be shown to have exceeded the regulatory takings limit. 91 The 
notion of an excessive deprivation of the right to use and enjoy 
property thus incorporates particularized analyses of individual ex-
pectations. For example, land that is originally zoned light industrial 
and which is subsequently zoned residential retains market value as 
residential property, and perhaps may not be adjudicated a taking 
Longtin, Avoiding and Defending Constitutional Attacks on Land Use RegUlations (Includ-
ing Inverse Condemnation), 38B NIMLO MUN. L. REV. 192-93 (1975), quoted in San Diego 
Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 655 n.22 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
86 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
87 Id. at 124 (quoting United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958)). 
88 I d. Concerning the character of the governmental regulation, the Court divided interfer-
ence with ownership into two categories: physical invasions and regulations ("public program[sl 
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good"). Id. 
According to the Court, a taking will most likely be found in cases involving interference that 
is physical rather than regulatory. Id. 
89Id. 
90 This discussion presumes that the regulation in question affects a number of landowners 
in the community, and is not a specific rezoning intended to avert construction of a politically 
unpopular project. 
91 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); see supra notes 11-13 and 
accompanying text. 
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for that reason. But if an owner purchased land in the light industrial 
zone prior to the downzoning, intending to develop it specifically for 
that purpose, and invested money in preparation for the develop-
ment of light industrial uses, a court may find that the owner has 
formed an "investment-backed expectation" to develop the parcel as 
he or she originally planned. 92 In practice, then, a complete depri-
vation of property value may not be necessary in order for a regu-
lation to rise to the level of a taking. Alternatively, where an in-
vestment has been made in the development of a property, it may 
be sufficient that a regulation has deprived a property owner of the 
value of his or her investment and anticipated profits. The deter-
mination will depend, of course, on the degree to which the expec-
tation is investment-backed. 
The evaluation of the amount and types of investments that have 
been made suggests an analysis similar to that undertaken when 
claimants assert a "vested right" in a development project. When 
claimants allege vested rights, the following factors are generally 
considered: whether the developer had received governmental ap-
proval for the project; the amount of nonrecoverable expenses the 
developer had incurred; and the "subcategories of development 
costs" in which the developer had invested. 93 It is apparent that, if 
a landowner has not yet applied for a permit or otherwise secured 
approval for a project, a municipality will have no way of knowing 
what expectation the landowner entertains for the parcel. 94 Such 
landowners, those who expect to put their land to the most intensive 
use allowed prior to rezoning but who have not yet sought approval 
for their projects, are situated in a "blind spot" in any ex ante 
evaluation of the impact of proposed regulation. 95 
9'2 See, e.g., Nemmers v. City of Dubuque, 764 F.2d 502, 503-04 (8th Cir. 1985) (developer 
who invested in the development of a light industrial park held to have a vested right in the 
zoned status of his land and awarded compensation for municipal downzoning of property for 
residential use). 
9:3 See R. ELLICKSON & D. TARLocK, supra note 82, at 203-04. 
94 Neither permits or governmental approvals are required to vest right. See, e.g., American 
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 19 Ill. App. 3d 30, 34-35, 311 N.E.2d 
325, 328-29 (1974) (expenditures of $213,000 on development plans sufficient to vest rights). 
95 The risk of having to compensate these unforeseen takings claims (claims that will be 
filed by owners who have not yet applied for the appropriate permits) is inherent in a 
municipality's original decision to enact less restrictive zoning regulation. A municipality 
assumes the risk of these unforeseen claims when it decides to supercede existing regulation 
with regulation that is more restrictive. The question remains, however, whether municipal-
ities should be compelled to compensate these claims in every case, or whether municipalities 
should be afforded an opportunity to review them in order to permit individual adjustments 
in some cases, such as variances. 
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The ripeness and exhaustion doctrines are intended, in part, to 
reveal investment-backed expectations, and to establish the extent 
to which they are thwarted by municipal regulation. Controversies 
must be ripe for review, or administrative procedures exhausted, 
before courts will adjudicate the validity of land-use regulation. 96 
The ex ante analysis of the impact of municipal land-use regulation 
is limited because it is impossible to detect and account for invest-
ment-backed expectations. These effects can only be gauged ex post, 
after the regulation is in place and property owners have had an 
opportunity to file petitions for administrative review. In such cases, 
a petition for review will be a municipality's first notice that a 
regulation may be excessive and invalid as it applies to a particular 
landowner. 
The necessity of carrying on the evaluative process after the reg-
ulation has become effective should be reflected in the duration 
assigned to the compensation period for temporary regulatory tak-
ings. The compensation period and the "event" that initiates it should 
encourage owners to seek administrative review as soon as possible 
after the regulation has been imposed, requiring them to present 
proof of their investment-backed expectations, possibly in the form 
of development plans for the site. In addition, the compensation 
period should encourage municipalities to expedite a thorough re-
view process. 
The duration of the interim takings period according to the First 
English holding is by no means clear. But in the absence of an explicit 
statement concerning which procedural "event" should inaugurate 
the takings period, the holding certainly does not provide owners 
with an incentive to file petitions for review early, because it is 
arguable that the First English Court intended that compensation 
be paid retroactive to the date a regulation was either enacted or 
first enforced. 97 
If this argument accurately reflects the majority's view, First 
English gives municipalities an incentive to expedite the review of 
an owner's claim, perhaps at the expense of thoroughness. For ex-
ample, wealthy developers could wait for some time before the ex-
piration of the limitations period in order to maximize the duration 
96 Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). 
The Court stated that "the economic impact of the challenged action and the extent to which 
it interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations ... cannot be evaluated until 
the administrative agency has arrived at ~. final, definitive position regarding how it will apply 
the regulations at issue to the particular land in question." Id. at 191 (citations omitted). 
97 See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text. 
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of the compensation period, and increase the stakes for the munici-
pality. The municipality, already faced with substantial liability, 
would be encouraged to take as little time as possible to review the 
developer's claim in order to minimize the duration of the compen-
sation period. The municipality also would be encouraged to evaluate 
the impact of the regulation on the developer's property conserva-
tively. The existence of a potentially large liability, incurred as the 
result of a developer's delay in filing a petition for review, would 
encourage overprecaution on the part of the regulatory authorities. 
Furthermore, the larger the proposed project, the greater the lia-
bility, and the greater the incentive for the municipality to err on 
the side of overprecaution. Projects that would have the greatest 
community impact conceivably could receive the least thorough, and 
the least balanced, municipal review. In short, a compensation period 
retroactive to the date a regulation was enacted or first enforced 
encourages property owners and developers to use the processes of 
administrative review strategically. 
The tendency toward overprecaution and underregulation inher-
ent in the maximized compensation period suggested by First En-
glish would be alleviated if the date the property owner filed a 
petition for review was used as the inaugural "event" of the interim 
period. The principal benefit of such a rule is that it would encourage 
landowners to file their petitions for administrative review as soon 
as possible after the regulation becomes effective. The incentive for 
the municipality to expedite the review of landowner petitions would 
remain unchanged, because any delay merely would add to the total 
liability should a court later hold that the final administrative dis-
position of an owner's claim effected a taking. Duration measured 
from the time of filing for a petition for review, by encouraging 
property owners to file petitions early, would also have the added 
benefit of reducing administrative costs by allowing the regulating 
authority to resolve associated claims simultaneously rather than in 
fits and starts. 
The drawback of measuring the duration of the compensation 
period from the time that applications for administrative review are 
filed is the same drawback that besets the longer compensation 
period suggested by the First English holding: the time a munici-
pality will be willing to take to review claims is in inverse proportion 
to the size of the project. As a result, owners who wish to undertake 
smaller projects that will have only localized effects may wait dis-
proportionately longer for a final ruling than owners who wish to 
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proceed with larger projects that will have an impact on the com-
munity as a whole. Larger projects will tend to be scrutinized less 
thoroughly than smaller projects. Initiating the compensation period 
with an application for administrative review removes the incentive 
for owners and developers to use the administrative process stra-
tegically, but it leaves in place the inequality of treatment accorded 
large and small claimants. To the extent that it encourages munici-
palities to accelerate administrative review of large projects, the 
shorter compensation period may also fail to root out overprecaution 
and underregulation. 
One solution to this problem would be a fixed "interim" period 
after the filing of a petition for review during which the compensation 
period would be tolled. Such a fixed period would guarantee that 
larger projects receive the close review that they merit and would 
also allow municipalities to prioritize pending petitions so that 
smaller claimants would not be forced to wait longer than claimants 
whose projects represent larger potential liabilities for municipali-
ties. 
Another solution to the problems of inequality of treatment among 
claimants and rash evaluation may be one that is unrelated to interim 
damages. Specifically, penalities for undue delay would promote 
thorough and fair administrative review of proposed uses. This so-
lution would require the creation of a category of "large projects" 
separate from those smaller projects that would be compensated 
with interim damages. This "large project" category could include 
proposed uses whose value exceeded a specified percentage of the 
annual municipal budget. 
The duration of the compensation period for temporary regulatory 
takings should incorporate incentives promoting the timely, fair, and 
thorough review of grievances. Those incentives accord with the 
purpose of the compensation scheme overall: to certify that the 
burdens and benefits of land-use regulation are distributed fairly 
among all members of the community. This presumes that the com-
pensation scheme itself will not skew administrative processes to 
the extent that it encourages some level of underregulation or ov-
erregulation. Such inefficiencies, however, are inherent in the com-
pensation period suggested in First English, which appears to re-
quire that damages be paid retroactive to the date an invalid 
regulation was enacted or first enforced. A slightly foreshortened 
compensation period, retroactive to the date the landowner files a 
petition for administrative review, encourages the earliest possible 
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resolution of takings claims, deprives owners and developers of the 
opportunity to use the review process strategically, and promotes 
fair and equal treatment of claims and claimants. 
V. FAIRNESS AND PREDICTABILITY 
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,98 Justice 
Brennan conceded that fifty-six years had elapsed since Pennsyl-
vania Coal Co. v. Mahon, and the Supreme Court was no closer to 
developing a "set formula" by which to determine the validity of 
municipal land-use regulation. 99 The lack of a "set formula" notwith-
standing, Justice Brennan discovered in the Court's previous opin-
ions several factors that have particular significance: 
The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, 
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered 
with distinct investment-backed expectations are of course rel-
evant considerations. So too is the character of the governmental 
action. A "taking" may more readily be found when the inter-
ference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion 
by government, than when interference arises from some public 
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to 
promote the common good. 100 
Justice Brennan's reference to the difference in the character of 
governmental action discloses an anti-redistributive rationale for 
regulatory takings jurisprudence, which is consistent with takings 
jurisprudence generally. Specifically, Justice Brennan remarked that 
a taking will "more readily be found" when property is subject to 
physical invasion, suggesting that a regulatory taking would be a 
redistributive transaction different in quality but identical in effect 
with governmental interference that is physically intrusive. The 
analogy further suggests how the two qualitatively different types 
of intrusions on ownership are alike fundamentally. Just as the owner 
whose land is physically invaded, the victim of a regulatory taking 
suffers the injury alone, or is a member of a minority that is damaged 
similarly. lOl And like the owner subjected to physical invasion, the 
98 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
99 [d. at 124. 
100 [d. (citations omitted). 
101 "[T]he Fifth Amendment's [guarantee is] 'designed to bar Government from forcing some 
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the 
public as a whole.''' First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los 
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 320 (1987) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 
(1960». 
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victim of a regulatory taking receives no reciprocal benefit as a result 
of the government's restriction on ownership.102 Alternatively, an 
ordinance that offsets regulatory burdens with reciprocal benefits 
certifies the non-redistributive purpose of the regulation. 103 
The other component in Justice Brennan's review of takings cri-
teria, "the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant,"104 is 
a clear reference to Mahon and a restatement of the diminution-in-
value test.105 Not only must the regulation single the victim out, it 
must single him or her out for particularly harsh treatment.106 Most 
representative of the idiosyncratic nature of the aggrieved owner's 
deprivation of property values, according to Justice Brennan, is "the 
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct invest-
ment-backed expectations."107 
The notion of investment-backed expectations introduces the is-
sues of fairness and predictability. Expectations are formed and 
investments are planned in reliance upon current zoning and the 
promise of municipal approval that it represents, or alternatively, 
upon the very real promise of rezoning to accommodate a proposed 
use. The reliance, then, is upon the political and administrative 
processes of municipal government, which are presumed to secure 
by means of due process and administrative review the integrity of 
the investments they encourage. Fairness and predictability thus 
are implicated simultaneously in the creation of owner expectations 
concerning the value of property, which represents the full range of 
uses allowed under a specific regulation. 
Predictability sustains public confidence in the values associated 
with each separate zoning regulation, both within the community, 
on the part of owners, and outside of it, on the part of potential 
investors who may wish to trade on those values.108 Predictability 
also involves public confidence in the processes of municipal land-
use management-that they will be well-ordered, and allow some 
102 See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 139-
40 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
103 See Rose, supra note 84, at 902. 
104 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. 
105 See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text. 
106 See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922). 
107 Agins, 447 U.S. at 262-63; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124; Michelman, Property, Utility, 
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations oJ "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. 
L. REV. 1165, 1212-13 (1967). 
108 See Rose, supra note 84, at 908-09 (likelihood of exit from unpredictable municipality 
acts as a check on unreasonable municipal behavior because local governments wish to dis-
courage developers from investing in other communities). 
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degree of participation in matters that will tend to affect the value 
of an owner's property. 
While predictability involves confidence in both the property val-
ues associated with various levels of zoning restrictions, and the 
regulatory processes by which they are created and administered, 
fairness has to do with the preservation of those values,109 within 
certain limits. 110 A regulation that is fair guarantees that individuals 
who have traded in reliance upon the market values represented by 
previous levels of restrictions on use will not suffer, according to 
Justice Brennan's formulation, too severe an interference with their 
distinct investment-backed expectations. In the alternative, if a reg-
ulation interferes with such investments to a degree that is exces-
sive, fairness, not to mention the Constitution, III demands that their 
value be compensated. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It is apparent that the principles of predictability and fairness 
must be incorporated into any damage formulation that is devised 
to compensate regulatory takings. To the extent that a damage 
formulation for regulatory takings can inspire the confidence of ag-
grieved property owners, it must hold forth some assurance of pro-
viding an effective resort when there is failure in administrative 
process. Public confidence therefore will extend beyond the predict-
ability of administrative processes that are merely well-ordered, to 
confidence in fair settlements when they are not. 
The discussion of the duration of the compensation period and the 
measure of the compensable property interest in the preceding sec-
tions of this Article point the way toward a damage formulation that 
embodies the principles of fairness and predictability. In terms of 
predictability, the initiation of the compensation period with the 
filing of an owner's petition for review would provide municipalities 
with an opportunity to respond to owner complaints soon after reg-
ulations are put into effect. This would serve to consolidate municipal 
action in cases when more than one complaint has been received, 
and would assist in focusing municipal attention on problems that 
may not have been apparent before the regulation became effective. 
Concerns with fairness, on the other hand, will depend to a greater 
extent on the measure of compensation for the injury an owner has 
109 Michelman, supra note 107, at 1172. 
llO See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
III U.S. CONST. amend. v. 
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sustained. Basing this calculation on the value of the owner's pro-
posed use, as well as the degree to which the invalid municipal 
restrictions deprived the owner of that value, would seem to yield 
an accurate measure of the owner's injury. Furthermore, such a 
calculation is fair to the owner in the additional sense that it provides 
municipalities with a disincentive to attempt future redistributions 
of value, because it makes municipalities fully liable for the invalid 
restrictions they impose. The more severely an invalid restriction 
diminishes the value of an owner's property, the greater would be 
the municipal liability. 
Finally, a damage formulation that successfully compensates reg-
ulatory takings should favor neither the property owner nor the 
municipality. Compensation that fails to restore to the victim the 
value of property improperly restricted will fail to provide munici-
palities with a sufficient disincentive to prohibit regulation that is 
redistributive in effect. The result will be some measure of overre-
gulation. Similarly, a damage formula that favors victims by com-
pensating them beyond the measure of the harm they sustained, and 
which thus maximizes municipal liability, will result in overprecau-
tion on the part of the regulating authorities, and some degree of 
underregulation. Concerns with fairness and predictability require 
cancelling the redistributive effects of regulatory takings. A damage 
formulation that simultaneously compensates victims for the eco-
nomic harms they sustain, and that provides municipalities with an 
effective disincentive to prevent future redistributions, would suc-
cessfully satisfy both of these concerns. 
